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ABSTRACT
This paper develops the view that employer-sponsored pension plans are
best understood as retirement income insurance for employees and from that
perspective addresses a number of questions regarding the reasons for their
existence, their design, and their funding and investment policies. The most
important of these questions are:
- Whydo employers provide pension plans for their employees and why is
participation usually mandatory?
- Whyis the defined benefit form of pension plan the dominant one rather
than defined contribution?
- Whyare the payout options under most plans limited to life annuities?
- Whyare most plans integrated with Social Security?
- Whydon't corporate pension plans follow the extreme funding and asset
allocation policies that seem to be optimal from the perspective of
shareholder wealth maximization?
- Whydo employers often make ad hoc increases in pension benefits not
strictly required under the formula in defined benefit plans?
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1. Introduction
By almost any measure pension funds are today one of the
most important institutions in the U.S. economy. Millions of
Americans depend on them for a substantial part of their
retirement income, and retirement decisions are heavily
influenced by them.1 A large fraction of national savings takes
the form of pension contributions.2 The recent declining trend
in the private savings rate nay in part be explained by the
growth in pension plans and changes in their funding policies.3
In 1988 assets of pension plans amounted to almost $2
trillion, representing the largest single pool of investable
funds. The investment policy of pension funds has a profound
effect on capital market rates and security prices. The crash of
the stock market in October 1987, for example, may have been
aggravated by the dynamic hedging strategies employed by pension
fund money managers. An understanding of the economic function
of these plans is critical for plan sponsors, for their
11n 1987 42 million American employees were covered by
employer pension plans. See Turner and Beller (1989) Table 1.2.
21n 1987 the share of private pensions in net personal savings
was 24.4%. Source: Turner and Beller (1989) Table A 13.
3After growing rapidly for 15 years, pension contributions
have leveled off in the 1980's. In part this may be a result of
the bull market in stocks and bonds in the 1980's that has resulted
in full funding of most corporate plans. See Munnell and
Ernsberger (1987)
—1—professional money managers, for the government officials charged
with regulating and/or insuring pension plans, and last but not
least for plan participants.
This paper takes the view that the primary economic function
of a pension plan is to provide retirement income security to
plan participants and that the behavior of plan sponsors with
regard to plan design, funding and investment policies can best
be understood from that perspective. This is the conventional
view of pensions expressed by most pension professionals, and it
is codified in the law that regulates private pension plans in
the U.S. .
Thereare other possible ways of viewing pension plans, many
of which have received attention from economists. First, pension
plans are an important incentive device in labor relations,
affecting employee turnover, work effort, and the timing of
retirement.5 Second, corporate pension funding and asset
allocation policies are an important element in corporate
finance.6 Finally, pension plans are a device for avoiding or at
4The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
mandates that private pension plans be operated for the exclusive
benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries.
Subsequent amendments to ERISA have not altered this basic
approach.The leading text book on private pensions, McGill
(1979), seems to adopt this perspective as well.
5See, for example, the collection of papers in Wise(l986).
For the impact of pension plans on retirement decisions see the
work by Fields and Mitchell (1984), Ippolito(1988), and Stock and
Wise(1988)
6See, for example, Bodie (1988) and the references cited
there.
—2—least deferring the payment of taxes. Many economists view the
tax—preferred status of pension plans as the principal reason for
their rapid growth since the end of World War ii! Both because
of these tax advantages and because they are insured by the
government, pensions are an issue for public finance.8 It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that economists specializing in
the areas of labor economics, financial economics, and public
finance have all analyzed, researched, and contributed to our
understanding of how the pension system works and how it
influences the economy.
But the labor relations, corporate finance, and tax-shelter
perspectives leave unanswered a number of important questions.
Among them are the following:
Why is the defined benefit form of pension plan the
dominant one rather than defined contribution?9
Why is participation in an employer's pension plan
usually mandatory?1°
7See for example, Blinder (1981) and Munnell(1982).
8See Ippolito (1986).
p71% of all employees covered by pension plans havea defined
benefit plan as their primary plan. See Turner and Beller(1989)
Table 4.6.
10Participation in defined benefit plans is almost always
mandatory, whereas participation in DC plans is often voluntary.
—3—• Why are the payout options under most plans limited to
life annuities?11
• Why are most plans integrated with Social Security?12
• Why don't corporate pension plans follow the extremal
funding and asset allocation policies that seem to be
optimal from the perspective of shareholder wealth
maximization?
• Why do employers often make ad hoc increases in pension
benefits not strictly required under the formula in
defined benefit plans?
These questions are best answered by viewing pensions as
retirement income insurance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
develop the concept of pensions as retirement income insurance
and explore the different kinds of insurance provided by defined
benefit and defined contribution plans. We show how the defined
benefit form offers the most complete type of retirement income
insurance and explain why the defined contribution form makes
sense as a supplement. In section 3 we examine reasons why the
employer is a logical provider of this insurance. In section 4
we address the major puzzle confronting the insurance perspective
This is almost always the case with defined benefit plans and
with DC plans that serve as the employer's primary plan. When a
DC plan is a supplement to another plan then lump—sum payouts are
almost always an option.
12According to a 1980 Bankers Trust Survey as many as 87% of
private defined benefit plans with pay—related formulas were
integrated with Social Security.
—4—on pensions: why pension plans do not insure against inflation.
In section 5 we explore the implications of the insurance
perspective for corporate pension policy, and in section 6 its
implications for public policy. Finally, in section 7 we
summarize our main results.
2. Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance
We start by thinking of an employer-sponsored pension plan
as a savings scheme for the provision of retirement income.
Through a combination of employer and employee contributions part
of the employee's total compensation during the working years is
deferred until retirement. This savings scheme can and often
does have a number of insurance features designed to protect the
employee against economic insecurity in retirement.
The major sources of retirement income risk that a risk—
averse employee would like to potentially insure against are:
1. Replacement rate inadequacy- This is the possibility
that the retiree will not have enough income to
maintain the same standard of living after retiring as
during the preretirement years.
2. Longevity- the risk that the retiree will outlive the
amount saved for the provision of retirement income.
3. Social Security cuts— the risk that the benefits
provided by the Social Security retirement system will
be cut before the individual reaches retirement age.
4. Investment risk- the possibility that the amount saved
—5—for retirement will be inadequate because the assets in
which they were invested performed poorly.
5. Inflation risk- the risk that inflation will erode the
purchasing power of retirement savings.
2.1 Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
Before considering each of these risks separately and
examining how a pension plan can provide insurance against them,
we must briefly distinguish between two basic types of pension
plan that differ significantly in the kinds of insurance they
provide: defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB).
The DC arrangement is conceptually the simpler of the two.
Under a DC plan, each employee has an account into which the
employer and the employee (in a contributory plan) make regular
contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contributions
and investment earnings of the accumulation in the account.
Contributions usually are specified as a predetermined
fraction of earnings, although that fraction need not be constant
over the course of a career. Contributions from both parties are
tax-deductible, and investment income accrues tax—free. At
retirement, the employee typically receives an annuity whose size
depends on the accumulated value of the funds in the retirement
account.
Often the employee has some choice as to how the account is
to be invested. In principle, contributions may be invested in
any security, although in practice most plans limit investment
—6—options to various bond, stock, and money market funds. The
employee bears all the investment risk; the retirement account is
by definition fully funded, and the firm has no obligation beyond
making its periodic contribution.
In a DB plan, the employee's pension benefit entitlement is
determined by a formula that takes into account years of service
for the employer and, in most cases, wages or salary. Many
defined benefit formulas also take into account the Social
Security benefit to which an employee is entitled. These are
called "integrated" plans.
In a typical DB plan, the employee might receive retirement
income equal to 1% of final salary times the number of years of
service. Thus, an employee retiring after 40 years of service
with a final salary of $15,000 per year would receive a
retirement benefit of 40% of $15,000, or $6,000 per year.
The annuity promised to the employee is the employer's
liability. The present value of this liability represents the
amount of money that the employer must set aside today in order
to fund the deferred annuity that commences upon the employee's
retirement.
2.2 Replacement Rate Risk
For most people the process of planning and saving for an
adequate level of retirement income is very difficult. Even the
simplest models are often too complicated for the average
individual to grasp. And even for people who are educated enough
—7—to understand the calculations required, the discipline to
implement the savings plan voluntarily is often lacking. While
statistics on this are hard to find, it is probably correct to
say that most people do not even make rough estimates of how much
they should be saving in order to insure an adequate level of
income in retirement.
Indeed, one of the main arguments in support of the Social
Security retirement system is that people want the government to
force them to save for retirement through a payroll tax that
finances at least a minimal level of benefits in retirement.
Employer pensions can be viewed as a supplement to Social
Security designed to insure that the combined income from both
sources will enable retirees to maintain their preretirement
standard of living. By having your employer automatically defer
a portion of your earnings through a pension plan, you may be
able to impose a saving discipline on yourself that otherwise
might be lacking.
2.3 Social Security Risk
Now let us consider Social Security risk. While you may
know the rules governing your expected benefits from the Social
Security system now, those rules have a history of changing in
unpredictable ways. Most of the changes in the past have been
benefit enhancements, but few observers of the system are
currently predicting a continuation of that trend. On the
contrary, many are predicting cutz in Social Security benefits in
—8—the future.
The integration of employer-provided pensions with Social
Security is one method of insuring plan participants against this
risk. While integration is fairly widespread in DB plans, it is
rare in DC plans. In the typical integrated plan, the level of
pension benefits is equal to a percentage of final average salary
less some proportion of the individual's Social Security benefit.
This is, in effect, employer—provided insurance against
reductions in Social Security benefits.'3 In plans that offer
early retirement benefits that begin before the starting age for
receipt of Social Security, there is often a provision that pays
retirees an extra benefit until they reach the starting age for
Social Security benefits. These supplementary payments are
usually terminated once the individual starts receiving Social
Security benefits.
Where the principal plan is of the DC form, the combined
level of employer and employee contributions is usually designed
to produce an adequate level of retirement income when combined
with Social Security, but there is almost never a formal
automatic Social Security offset provision of the sort found in
integrated DB plans. DC plans do not therefore offer as complete
insurance against Social Security risk as do DE plans.
Merton, Bodie, and Marcus (1987) for a more complete
discussion of this point.
—9—2.4 Longevity Risk
Next there is the risk that you will outlive your retirement
savings. One way you could insure against the risk of exhausting
your savings during retirement is by saving in the form of life
annuity contracts. But the private market for life annuities is
plagued by the problem of adverse selection. In this context the
adverse selection problem is that there will be a tendency for
people with a higher than average life expectancy to have a high
demand for this kind of insurance, and those with lower than
average life expectancy to have a relatively low demand. In the
competitive equilibrium the average individual will find the
equilibrium price unattractive and will tend to self-insure
against longevity risk by providing an extra reserve of
retirement savings. Studies of the private annuities market seem
to confirm the theory that private annuities are priced
unattractively for the average individual.14
Employer pension plans offer a way of overcoming the adverse
selection problem. By making participation in the plan mandatory
and offering life annuities as the only payout option, the cost
of insuring each participant can be kept low. While this is not
the only reason offered to explain the prevalence of the
compulsory nature of plan participation and annuity payouts, it
14See Friedman and Warshawsky (1988).
—10—is certainly a possible one.15
It is worth pointing out in this connection an unintended
but important consequence of the growth of pension plans for the
national economy. By providing a low cost way of obtaining
longevity insurance, pension plans may reduce the incentive for
households to self—insure through greater private savings. The
result could be that the aggregate level of private savings in
the economy falls.16
2.5 Investment Risk
For most people the question of how much to save for
retirement is matched in complexity by the question of how to
invest whatever they save. The array of investment choices
offered by financial institutions and markets often bewilders the
ordinary citizen who is untutored in the fundamentals of finance.
On this issue there is a fundamental difference between
defined contribution and defined benefit plans. It is often
stated that a major advantage of the DB form is that it allows
the participant to avoid investment risk. But that is somewhat
15There are two other explanations that have been offered for
mandatory participation and annuity payouts in pension plans. They
are essentially the same as the reasons given for a mandatory
Social Security retirement income system. The first is that people
are myopic and will not do what is best for themselves in the area
of providing for retirement income unless forced to. The second
is the "free rider" argument that people know that others will not
let them go hungry in old age, so they will not voluntarily provide
enough for their own retirement.
16See Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Hubbard (1987), and Bernheiin
and Shoven(1988).
—11—misleading because many DC plans offer investment options with
minimal risk.'7 What most DC plans do not offer and all DB plans
do is a guarantee that the combination of plan contributions and
investment income will be enough to provide a prespecified
benefit at retirement.
Employers whose primary pension plan is of the DB form
usually offer their employees additional voluntary tax—deferred
savings plans. These supplementary plans, which are always DC in
form, usually provide a variety of investment options and often
are subsidized by matching contributions from the employer. In
this way employers seek to provide a guaranteed floor of
retirement income that is free of investment risk, while
maintaining a tax—sheltered environment for additional retirement
savings that can be invested as the employee sees fit.
2.6 Inflation Risk
While Social Security benefits and pension benefits under
some public plans are insured against inflation, the vast
majority of private pension plans offer no automatic inflation
protection. During the preretireinent years pension savings are
partially protected against inflation through a variety of means,
but virtually no private pension plans in the U.S. offer
'7For example, under the DC plan offered to most university
faculty by Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), a
participant can allocate 100% of contributions to a money market
fund.
—12—automatic inflation protection in the post—retirement period.18
The supplementary voluntary defined contribution plans
offered by many employers are often viewed as a way of providing
inflation insurance. These plans are encouraged both by tax
favored treatment from the IRS and often by matching
contributions from the employer. While these supplementary plans
certainly offer participants the opportunity to save more for
retirement, they do not currently offer cost—of—living
guarantees, and in that sense are not strictly speaking inflation
insurance.
Many plan sponsors have in the past offered voluntary ad hoc
increases in payments to retired employees to help offset the
effects of inflation.19 This indicates that at least these
employers may view the pension contract as a quasi—guarantee of
real and not just nominal retirement benefits. Why employer
pensions do not offer complete inflation insurance is a major
question to be discussed in some detail later in this paper.
3. Why The Employer Is a Logical Provider of Retirement Income
Insurance.
In principle there are a variety of ways that individuals
18The principle means of protecting the real value of benefits
accrued during the preretirement years is by having a benefit
formula that ties the retirement benefit to average earnings during
the last few years of employment. This form of wage indexation
stops at retirement, however.
19See Clark, Allen, and Sumner (1983) for a discussion of the
these ad hoc increases.
—13—could acquire the different kinds of retirement income insurance
discussed above. Why then is there a strong tendency for
employers to provide it?
3.1 Tax Incentives.
Certainly a sufficient reason to explain the prevalence of
employer—sponsored pension plans are the big tax advantages of
this form of saving in the U.S. While from time to time the U.S.
government has offered similar tax incentives for individual
household retirement saving, they have usually been much more
limited.20 Indeed, given the magnitude of the tax savings
involved and the low administrative costs associated with some
types of defined contribution plans, it is surprising to find
employers who do not offer some sort of tax—qualified retirement
savings plan to their employees.
But even in the absence of these tax advantages, there are
other reasons to view employers as logical providers of this
insurance. Indeed, one of the reasons that legislators have
conferred these tax advantages on employer—provided plans is that
employers are seen as the appropriate providers.
3.2 Informational Efficiencies.
It is costly to acquire the knowledge necessary to prepare
20For example, opportunities to shelter retirement saving from
taxes through Individual Retirement Accounts have been subject to
a number of restrictions that can be avoided through employer-
sponsored plans.
—14—and implement long run plans for income provision. While it is
true that every individual's life-time financial plan depends on
preferences that are known only to that individual, people have
enough in common in this regard that a standard retirement
savings plan can prove suitable to a vast number of people.
Furthermore, an employer often has better access to some of
the information relevant to preparing long run financial plans
for its employees than do the employees themselves. In
particular the employer has a better knowledge of the probable
path of future labor income for its employees. By providing a
basic plan that saves enough to provide for replacement of the
likely future stream of labor earnings, the employer can
therefore save more efficiently than can the employees
separately.
In this connection it should be pointed out that in order
for the sponsor to provide efficiently for future wage and salary
replacement of its employees, it is enough to have accurate
forecasts of the earnings of the group as a whole and not the
individual earnings of each member of the group. It is far
easier, although by no means easy, to forecast group earnings
than it is to forecast an individual's future earnings.
3.3 Agency Problems.
While it is certainly true that employers and employees
often have conflicting economic interests, in many respects their
interests coincide. Employers who acquire a reputation for
—15—taking care of the retirement needs of their employees may find
it easier to recruit and retain higher quality employees in the
future. If an attitude of trust and good will towards the
employer develops in the minds of the employees, then motivation
and labor productivity may be enhanced. Employers therefore have
some economic incentive to act in the best interests of their
employees.
Other possible providers of retirement planning services may
be less suitable as beneficial agents of the employee. Insurance
agents, stock brokers, and others who are often engaged in
providing these services to individual households may be less
trustworthy than the employer because they may be interested in
selling the individual some product or service that the
individual would not choose were he well-informed. These other
agents may be motivated to persuade the individual to save too
much for retirement or to invest in inappropriate ways. Anyone
who has ever tried to find competent and impartial personal
financial planning or investment advice is aware of the
difficulties.
The trust of the employees is further enhanced when they
know that the sponsor's own management team is covered by the
same pension plan as the other employees. This is often the
case. Indeed, Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimination rules
for tax qualification of pension plans are designed to assure
that the benefits received by the most highly compensated plan
participants are in some sense commensurate with those of the
—16—lowest paid plan participants.
3.4 Access to Capital Markets
Plan sponsors, be they private firms or state or local
governments, often have access to capital markets that is
unavailable to their employees on an individual basis. Thus
while a risk faced by an individual employee may be uninsurable
directly through the capital markets, it may be insurable through
the employer.
Of course, financial intermediaries such as insurance
companies exist precisely for this reason, and for many purposes
they provide a suitable vehicle for the insurance needs of
employees. But often a financial intermediary will not be
willing to provide enough of the insurance desired by the
individual at an efficient price because of problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard.
Longevity insurance is an important example of this. In
principle longevity risk is to a large extent diversifiable and
can be largely eliminated through risk pooling and sharing. But
as described earlier the problem of adverse selection can make
the private insurance market for life annuities inefficient.
Group insurance through pension plans is a solution to this
problem.
In most cases it is possible to imagine other types of
actual or potential financial intermediaries that could offer the
kinds of insurance embodied in employer—provided pension plans.
—17—Indeed, often small employers will contract with financial
institutions like insurance companies or mutual funds to provide
some or all aspects of its pension services. But that fact just
suggests that when a plan sponsor chooses not to provide
retirement income insurance through an outside contractor, it
views itself as the efficient provider.21
4. Inflation Insurance and Pension Plans
This brings us to a consideration of the one important type
of retirenent income risk that pension plans in the U.S. do not
insure against: inflation risk. There exists considerable
controversy among economists and others about the extent to which
existing pension promises can be viewed as real or nominal.22
But even the advocates of the "real" view admit that the
inflation protection afforded by pension plans is far from
complete and in most cases is implicit rather than explicit.
4.1 Sensitivity of Defined Benefit Plans to Inflation
The accrual patterns and real benefit streams under
virtually all private DB plans in the U.S. are extremely
2mOften plan sponsors have difficulty finding insurance
companies willing to provide the kinds of pension insurance called
for under the plan. This may be due to the fear of moral hazard.
That is, the insurance company may fear that the employer and
employee can conspire to burden it with unforeseen liabilities.
22For the "real" view see Ippolito (1986).For the nominal
view see Bulow (1982). In the next section of the paper I will
argue that those who take the real view are mistaking a
participating insurance policy for an inflation—indexed policy.
—18—sensitive to inflation. Inflation reduces the real value of DB
entitlements because pension benefits are fixed in nominal terms
once an employee stops working for the plan sponsor. Thus an
increase in the rate of inflation reduces the value of accrued
benefits to all participating employees, but especially for those
who switch employers during their working careers.
For example, suppose you are 45 years old and have worked
for the same employer for 20 years. Assume thatyour DB plan
promises 1% of final salary per year of service; thatyour most
recent salary was $50,000; that normal retirementage is 65, and
that your life expectancy is age 80. Your claim on thepension
fund is a deferred annuity of $10,000 per year starting atage 65
and lasting for 15 years.
If you leave your current employer, what haveyou got?
Since the benefit is not indexed to any wage or price levelthe
way Social Security is, the benefit will be losing real value as
the price level goes up. Assuming inflation of 5%per year, the
value of $1 will have fallen to $.38 by the timeyou retire, so
your first year's benefit of $10,000 will have a real value of
only $3,800, and that value will continue to fall eachyear as
inflation continues. If, however, your employer indexesyour
benefit to the cost of living both before and afterretirement,
then you will have an annuity worth $10,000 of today'spurchasing
power per year for life.
Looking at the situation in terms of present values and
assuming a nominal discount rate of 9% per year and a real
—19—discount rate of 3% per year, your accruedbenefit if you switch
jobs or if the plan is terminatedhas a present value of $14,383.
With complete indexatiOn both before andafter retirement the
accrued benefit has a present value of $66,097.
It is often said that DB plans lack portability.But this
is not exactly correct. Once employees arevested they cannot
lose the annuity they have earned.Rather the problem is that
since this annuity is not indexed to thecost of living or to
wages its value is greatlydiminished if the employee switches
jobs or if the plan is terminated.
It should be pointed out that it is not justprivate DB
plans that fail to offer explicitindexatiOn to the cost of
living. DC plans in the u.s. also donot currently offer
inflation insurance.
4.2 Why Pension Plans Do Not ProvideInflation Insurance
So why then don't pension plans offerinflation insurance?
One reason frequently cited in the past wasthat plan sponsors
had no way to hedge the risk through anappropriate investment
strategy. This explanation, however,raises the question of why
integrated DB plans insure againstSocial Security risk even
though they have no apparent way of hedgingthat risk through an
appropriate investment strategy.
While it is true that in the past there havebeen no
financial instruments offering a risk-freereal rate of return in
the u.s., had there been a demand for them bypension funds there
—20—is little doubt that they would have come into existence.
Indeed, recently several financial institutions have introduced
financial instruments linked to the CPI. Their success or
failure will put the "lack of inflation hedge" explanation to the
test in the next several years.23
Another explanation is that people already have enough
inflation insurance. Most notably Social Security retirement
benefits are indexed to wages during the preretirement years and
to the CPI after retirement. Furthermore much personal saving
takes the form of investment in residential real estate, which
while not riskless, is probably hedged against inflation risk.24
Finally, there is money illusion. In economies where the
rate of inflation is not too high, people mistakenly treat
nominal values as if they were real. An example will help to
illustrate this point.
Many brokerage houses have in recent years advertised the
virtues of zero coupon bonds as vehicles for accumulating
retirement savings. They appeal to the potential investor by
stressing that for an investment of only $100 today you can
receive a guaranteed $560 20 years from now, for example. This
represents a nominal interest rate of 9% per year. Of course, if
the expected rate of inflation is 5% per year, that zero coupon
bond is offering a rather risky investment in real terms with an
23For a full discussion of index—linked bonds see Bodie (1988)
24See the papers by Feldstein (1983) and Summers (1983)
—21—expected real rate of return of only 4% per year.
How appealing would an index-linked investment seen if it
were advertised to offer a guaranteed real rate of 3% per year?
Would it be perceived to be less risky?
More to the point even professional financial planners often
fall into the trap of treating nominal annuities as if they were
real for retirement planning purposes. For example, most
planners will use a nominal rate of interest in converting an
expected future accumulation into a retirement annuity; or the
reverse: use a nominal discount rate to compute how much has to
be accumulated by retirement age in order to provide a given
benefit stream.
To illustrate this point, suppose you are 45 years old,
expect to retire at age 65, and to live for 20 more years
thereafter. Assume further that you want to supplement your
expected Social Security benefits with an additional $10,000 per
year in annuity income. How much do you need to save in each of
the next 20 years to accomplish that objective?
One way to answer this question is to use a nominal rate of
interest, say 9% per year, in your computations. The answer in
that case is $1,784 per year.25 But what you will then have is a
stream of benefits that is fixed in nominal terms. Assuming
25Since the length of the saving period equals the length of
the retirement period, we can find the answer by simply solving the
following equation for x:
x =10,000(1+.09)20
—22—inflation of 5% per year, your first benefit payment at age 65
will have a purchasing power in terms of today's dollars of only
$3,589, and your last benefit payment at age 85 will be worth
only $1,113.
If what you really wanted to do was to provide enough for a
benefit stream of $10,000 per year in terms of today's purchasinç
power then it would be more appropriate to use a real interest
rate of 4% per year in your calculation and to plan on saving a
constant real amount each year. The answer then would be $4,564
per year in contributions to the plan.26
Most people would prefer to believe that they need to save
only $1,784 per year to achieve their goal rather than $4,564.
This author has found himself regarded with great suspicion and
sometimes downright hostility when he has presented this analysis
to acquaintances who have requested advice about retirement
income planning. Perhaps money illusion is caused in part by
wishful thinking.
4.3 The Cost of Indexing a Defined Benefit Plan
Pension planners seen to be convinced that plan participants
are not willing to pay for inflation insurance through salary
reduction whether explicitly or implicitly.27 The way these
26To find the answer we solve the following equation for x:
x=lO,000(l.04)20
27ihavefound that the idea of inflation—indexing privat
pensions gets a very cool reception among pension professionals,
even when it is pointed out that the investment risk can bE
completely hedged by the plan sponsor. These professionals insis
—23—pension professionals see it, offering inflation insurance under
a DB plan with no offsetting reductions in the benefit formula
would increase pension costs for younger employees. This is
precisely the group that is least likely to place much value on
pension benefits in general and on inflation insurance in
particular. Whether this is because these plan participants
already have enough inflation insurance, because they are subject
to money illusion, or because they simply are myopic is an open
question.
To see how indexation of benefits under a DB plan would
increase pension costs, especially those for younger workers,
consider the following example. Suppose the plan pays a benefit
equal to 1% of final salary per year of service. Plan
participants enter the plan at age 25, retire at age 65, and live
till age 85. Let us assume that the employee's salary does not
grow in real terms and is a constant $30,000 per year. We assume
that the riskiess real rate of interest is 3% per year, and that
the nominal rate appropriate for discounting nominal annuities is
3% per year plus the expected rate of inflation plus a risk
premium of 1% per year.
Table 1 and Figure 1 compare the pattern of real economic
pension costs for an indexed pension and a conventional non-
indexed pension under the benefit formula specified above.
that plan participants would not be willing to pay the price in
foregone salary or wages for the additional retirement income
insurance.
—24—Table 1. Real Pension Costs as a Proportion of Salary
Conventional Pension Plan
Year of Indexed 5% 10%
Employment Pension Inflation Inflation
1 4.70% .32% .04%
10 6.13 .98 .24
20 8.24 3.10 1.31
30 11.07 9.18 6.50




Plan Costs $54,730 $23,383 $17,313
AssuTtions: The plan pays a benefit equal to 1% of final salary per year of service. Plan participants
enter the plan at age 25, retire at age 65, and live tiLl age 85. The eeployees salary does not grow in
real terms; it is a constant S30,000 per year. The riskiest real rate of interest is 3% per year, and the
nominal rate used for discounting nominal annuities is 9% per year for the 5% inflation case and 14% per
year for the 10% inflation case.
The real economic pension Cost ifl each year is defined as
the amount of money in dollars of today's purchasing power that
the sponsor would have to add to the fund at the end of the
specified year in order to fully fund the additional benefit
earned in that year.
The profile for the indexed plan is invariant with respect
to the rate of inflation both ex ante and ex post. For the
conventional plan, however, the profile of real pension costs
depends critically on the rate of inflation. In the table and
the figure we consider two alternative rates of inflation and
corresponding nominal interest rates: 5% inflation with a
nominal interest rate of 9% and 10% inflation with a nominal
interest rate of 14% per year.



















Assumptions: The plan pays a benefit equal to 1% of final
salary per year of service. Plan participants enter the
plan at age 25, retire at age 65, and live till age 85. The
employee's salary does not grow in real terms. The riskless
real rate of interest is 3% per year, and the nominal rate
used for discounting nominal annuities is 9% per year for
the 5% inflation case and 14% per year for the 10% inflation
case.
Year of8elOyn1t
+5% ofl5tfo1 0 10% iYfI8tOO
Figure 1
—26—In all cases the profile of real pension costs is
backloaded, that is, pension costs rise over the worker's career
even though real earnings are a constant $30,000 per year. For
the indexed pension this is true only because of the time value
of money: the older the worker, the closer the date of
retirement, and therefore the higher the present value cost of
providing an additional annuity equal to 1% of final salary. But
for the conventional plan the backloading is more pronounced and
is due to expected inflation as well as the effect of the real
interest rate. The higher the rate of inflation the greater the
degree of backloading of the conventional plan profile.
Furthermore the total present value of costs associated with
the conventional plan is a decreasing function of the rate of
inflation.Thepresent value of the costs of the indexed plan is
$54,729.50 as compared to $23,383.29 for the conventional plan
assuming 5% inflation and $17,312.72 assuming 10% inflation.
Considering the large additional cost associated with adding
a cost of living allowance (COLA) to this fairly typical plan
even for a moderate expected inflation rate of 5% per year, it is
not surprising to find that employers are reluctant to do it.
employees recognized this additional cost and valued the
additional benefit accordingly, then presumably plan sponsors
might be inclined to offer this kind of inflation insurance. The
fact that they do not might be interpreted as evidence that
employees, particularly in their younger years, do not value
inflation insurance highly enough.
—27—5. Implications for Corporate Pension Policy
5.1 Plan Design
The insurance perspective on pensions can help to explain
some of the salient patterns in plan design observed in the U.S.
The stylized facts and possible explanations for then along these
lines are as follows:
1. Large companies tend to have defined benefit plans as their
primary plan usually supplemented with voluntary defined
contribution plans whereas small plans tend to have defined
contribution plans only.28 This makes sense because some of
the insurance aspects of defined benefit pensions require
large numbers of employees in order to make the employer an
appropriate provider. In particular, economies of scale in
information processing and plan administration fall into
this category. In addition, in recent years the costs of
compliance with government regulations and PBGC insurance
that apply only to defined benefit plans have made it
prohibitively expensive for small firms to maintain DB
plans.
2. Plans for salaried employees are usually very different from
the plans for wage earners, especially when the latter are
unionized. Plans for salaried employees usually have
benefit formulas that link benefits to average pay in the
last few years of employment. Plans for unionized workers
28See Clark, Gohmann, and NcDermed (1988).
—28—tend to be flat benefit plans where the benefit is a certain
dollar amount per year of service regardless of earnings.
This makes sense in view of several important facts. First,
the firm's management usually participates in the plan for
salaried employees, so one might expect that its terms would
be more generous than plans that do not cover them. Second,
salaried employees are usually more highly compensated than
wage earners, so the tax advantage of deferring compensation
through the pension plan is worth more to them. Finally,
the union rather than the employer is typically viewed as
the appropriate trustee for the beneficial interests of its
membership. Management negotiates a total compensation
package with the union every two or three years and the
dollar amount of the flat pension benefit is part of that
package. Unions have shown a preference for this
arrangement over the alternatives available.
5.2 Funding and Investment Policy
If pensions are to be regarded primarily as retirement
income insurance policies then the natural perspective for
understanding pension funds is as financial intermediaries that
issue such policies. From this perspective a firm's defined
benefit pension fund is an insurance company subsidiary. While
there is no comprehensive or universally accepted theory of
financial intermediaries in general or of insurance companies in
particular, most scholars seem to believe that the key to
—29—understanding the funding and investment policies of these
institutions is the matching of assets and liabilities.29
The nature of the insurance policies issued under a defined
benefit plan varies with the specific type of plan and benefit
formula. As stated in the previous section, in plans for
salaried employees the benefits tend to be salary-related, a
proportion of either average final pay or career average pay, and
the benefits actually paid often exceed those specified by the
formula. The pensions offered under these plans are best viewed
as participating annuities that offer a guaranteed minimum
nominal benefit determined by the plan's benefit formula which is
enriched from time to time at the discretion of management based
on the performance of the fund's assets and the financial
condition of the plan sponsor.
The evidence in support of this contention is the fact that
many plans have given ad hoc voluntary benefit increases to plan
participants in the past. While these increases have been viewed
by many as evidence of implicit cost—of—living indexation they
area far cry from a formal COLA.
The distinction between viewing ad hoc benefit increases
madeby DB plans to retired employees as a COLA or as a
participating annuity has important consequences for the
investment policy of these plans. If the benefit obligation has
a COLA then the appropriate way to hedge on the asset side is by
29For a recent attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of
financial intermediation see Merton (1988).
—30—investing in inflation-hedge assets. If, on the other hand, the
DB obligation is a participating annuity with a guaranteed
minimum nominal benefit, a strategy of dynamic hedging or
"portfolio insurance" using nominal bonds, stocks, and a variety
of financial futures contracts makes sense.30
DB plans for salaried employees tend to be well funded.
This nay in part be because PBGC insurance covers only a portion
of the promised benefits for the highly compensated plan
participants, so the extra funding provides a cushion of
safety 31
Somewhatin contrast to corporate pension plans for salaried
employees are the separate plans for unionized employees, who are
usually wage earners. As explained in the previous section, in
single employer plans for unionized employees, the benefit
formula usually calls for a flat dollar amount per year of
service. The dollar amount is usually revised every few years in
the collective bargaining process.
These flat benefit plans tend to be relatively underfunded
compared to pay-related plans. There are at least three possible
reasons. First, increases negotiated every few years in the flat
dollar amount create past service liabilities that cannot be
prefunded under IRS regulations. Sponsors usually fund these
30For a more complete discussion of dynamic hedging, portfolio
insurance and related investment strategies see Bodie, Kane, and
Marcus (1989)
31See Light and Perold (1987) for a full discussion of this
point.
—31—past service liabilities gradually over the timeallowed by
ERISA. Second, employers view these pension liabilities asfixed
rather than as participating annuities. Any benefit increases
are a matter for negotiations with the union in the future as
part of a total compensation package. Third, thesebenefits are
usually low enough so that PBGC insurance covers them fully.
Since full benefit security is provided by the government, full
funding by the sponsor is not needed to insure the integrity of
the benefits from the perspective of the employees.32
Viewing DB pension liabilities as participating annuities
can help to explain the fact that the asset mix of DB plansdoes
not seem to differ significantly from the mix of DC plans.33
It can also account for the difference in the performance of
pension plans as compared to mutual funds. In a recent study
Berkowitz and Logue (1986) reported that the average risk—
adjusted performance of ERISA plans from 1968 to 1983 was lower
than returns experienced by other diversified portfolios in U.S.
financial markets. If pension plans are pursuing investment
strategies designed to hedge against downside risk, then we
should expect to find that their average rate of return will be
32lppolito (1986) offers a different explanation of the
relative underfunding of single—employer plans for unionized
employees. He views underfunding as a way for the employer to gain
bargaining power over the union.If the benefits promised are
fully guaranteed by the PBGC, however, the level of funding would
seem to be an issue between the plan sponsor and the PBGC, rather
than between the sponsor and the union.
33See Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart (1987).
—32—lower than the average return achieved by mutual funds.34
Viewing pension funds as insurance subsidiaries offering
participating annuities can also help to explain why we do not
observe the extreinal funding and asset allocation policies
predicted by sortie of the recent finance theory literature on
corporate pension policy, which has viewed pension fund assets
and liabilities as an integral part of the sponsor's assets and
liabilities. This integrated perspective requires managing the
firm's extended balance sheet, including both its conventional
assets and liabilities and its pension assets and liabilities, in
the best interests of the shareholders.
According to this view, the corporation's accrued pension
benefit obligations are money—fixed liabilities of the
shareholders. These obligations are assumed to be fully
guaranteed by the government, and therefore the corporation's
pension decisions become what amounts to a game between the
shareholders and various government agencies, a game that can be
and should be thought of as an integral part of corporate
financial policy.
The tax effects are the first, and for most companies, the
most important, part of this game. Because firms can effectively
earn a pretax rate of return on any assets held in the pension
341tshould be notedthat therisk-adjusted performance measure usedby Berkowitz and Logue is not really appropriate for measuring
the performance of pension funds because it ignores the positive
skewness of the distribution of returns that is the main objective
of portfolio insurance strategies.
—33—fund and pass these returns through to shareholders, much as if
the pension fund were an IRAorKeogh plan, the comparative
advantage of a pension fund lies in its ability to be invested in
the most heavily taxed assets.
This means that pension funds should be invested entirely in
taxable bonds, instead of common stock, real estate, or other
assets that in effect are taxed at lower marginal tax rates for
most shareholders, and that the corporation should fund its
pension plan to the maximum extent allowed by the IRS so as to
maximize the value of this tax shelter to shareholders. The tax
effects of pensions should therefore induce corporations to
follow extreme policies. Fully funded or overfunded pension
plans should place their assets entirely in taxable bonds.
A second effect that may influence pension funding and asset
allocation is the "pension put" effect. The PBGC's insurance of
pension benefits in effect gives the firm a put option. As with
any option, the value of this put increases with the risk of the
underlying asset. Thus, as long as the PBGC neither regulates
pension fund risk nor accelerates its own claim at the first sign
of financial distress, the firm has an incentive to undermine the
PBGC's claim. It can do so and maximize the value of its put
option by funding its pension plan only to the minimum
permissible extent and investing the pension assets in the
riskiest possible securities. This of course is the exact
opposite policy from the decision suggested by the tax effects
described above.
—34—This line of theoretical work leads to the conclusion that
corporate pension funds should pursue extremal policies: either
maximum funding and investment entirely in taxable bonds or
minimal funding and investment entirely in stocks. While there
is some evidence that the profitability and tax status of
corporations influence their pension funding and asset allocation
policies, it does not seem to be in the simple ways predicted by
this integrated balance sheet theory.35
6. Implications for Public Policy
From a public policy perspective it is potentially very
important to determine the extent to which private pension policy
is being guided by goals other than employee welfare
maximization. In the case of corporate defined benefit plans,
some competing objectives are shareholder wealth maximization or
the pursuit of power and influence by incumbent management.
Of course, there need be no inherent contradiction or
incompatibility between these goals. Indeed, as in so many other
areas of national economic and social policy in this country, the
presumption is usually that the pursuit of private interest will
ultimately result in the public good. However, since the
government provides substantial tax incentives for private
pension plans and is involved in providing insurance of corporate
pension liabilities, it is important to understand the specific
35See Bodie (1988)
—35—mechanisms whereby this compatibility is to be achieved.
In passing ERISA in 1974 the U.S. Congress made clear its
intention that private pension plans are to be managed solely to
insure retirement income security for plan participants. In
subsequent amendments to that act, Congress has sought to prevent
practices that seem to thwart this objective.
While there has been close to a national consensus that the
government should encourage voluntary employer provision of
retirement benefits, there is no such consensus regarding the
issue of whether preference should be given to defined benefit or
defined contribution pension plan designs. Current public policy
seems to be neutral on this issue in both intent and action. The
analysis in this paper suggests that the existing variety of plan
designs may be economically efficient. Most large firms sponsor
defined benefit plans offering relatively low cost standardized
retirement income insurance and supplement them with a selection
of voluntary defined contribution plans that offer employees
considerable flexibility in adjusting benefit levels to their own
unique circumstances.
The issue of inflation insurance is perhaps more
controversial. If the reason for an absence of inflation
insurance in most employer pension plans is money illusion, then
a case can be made for some type of government intervention to
increase the informational efficiency of the system in this
regard. In the U.K. the government has gone as far as to mandate
the indexation of the minimum level of employer—provided pension
—36—benefits, and the government of the Province of Ontario, Canada
is on the verge of adopting similar measures.36 In the U.S.,
advocates of indexation have long urged the U.S. Treasury to
issue index—linked bonds to serve as the asset base for indexed
private pensions.37 In the light of the recent issuance of
private index—linked securities by several financial institutions
in the U.S., such governnent initiatives may be unnecessary,
however desirable they may still be.
36See Friedland (1988) for the Canadian situation and Hemming
and Kay (1982) for the U.K.
375ee, for example, Munnell (1988).
—37—7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has taken the view that employer-sponsored
pension plans are best understood as retirement income insurance
for employees. This view helps to answer a number of questions
regarding the reasons for the existence of employer—provided
pension plans, their design, and their funding and investment
policies. We can summarize these answers as follows:
Employers provide pensions because it is economically
efficient for then to supply the kind of retirement income
insurance that their employees desire. Employers often have
better access to information regarding past and future
earnings of employees than the employees themselves; can
benefit from economies of scale in processing this
information for long range personal financial planning; can
easily implement forced saving for employees by deferring
wages and salaries; and can avoid some of the adverse
selection problems that make private insurance markets for
deferred life annuities inefficient.
The dominant form of employer pension plan is defined
benefit because this form provides more complete insurance
against the major sources of retirement income risk than
does the defined contribution form.
The failure of virtually all private pension plans in the
U.S. to provide inflation insurance can be explained by some
combination of two possibilities: (1) the other assets of
the elderly provide more than enough inflation insurance and
—38—(2) money illusion may cause plan participants to
systematically undervalue this type of insurance.
We can understand many of the funding and asset allocation
policies of corporate defined benefit funds by thinking of
then as insurance subsidiaries of the sponsoring
corporation. As such their primary concern is to hedge the
pension liabilities incurred by the parent corporation.
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